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PLAYING WITH FIRREA, NOT GETTING BURNED:
STATUTORY OVERVIEW OF THE FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS REFORM, RECOVERY AND
ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1989
INTRODUCTION
In response to the continuing crisis in the savings and loan ("S&L")
industry, President Bush signed into law the Financial Institutions Re-
form, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA"). 1 Approved
by Congress in the Summer of 1989, the Act was designed, among other
things, "to promote, through regulatory reform, a safe and stable system
of affordable housing finance." 2
While widely considered a bailout statute for failed depository institu-
tions,3 FIRREA was enacted to rectify existing problems in the thrift
industry and to establish "a new era for insured institutions and their
regulators."4 This Note provides an overview of FIRREA, while empha-
sizing salient points of the statute not exhaustively addressed elsewhere
in the survey. In addition, the Note discusses Congress' main objectives
in enacting FIRREA, how these objectives were achieved through the
Act, and FIRREA's effect on existing regulatory agencies.
I. PRE-FIRREA
Providing affordable home financing has been a priority of the Federal
1. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L
No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified at various sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.) [here-
inafter "FIRREA"].
2. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 101(1), 103 Stat. at 187 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1811).
3. See id § 204(c)(1)-(5), 103 Stat. at 191 (amending section 3(c) of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. § 1813(c)(1)-(5))). These terms are defined as:
"(1) Depository Institution.-The term 'depository institution' means any
bank or savings association.
"(2) Insured Depository Institution.-The term 'insured depository institu-
tion' means any bank or savings association the deposits of which are insured by
the [Federal Deposit Insurance] Corporation pursuant to this Act.
"(3) Institutions Included for Certain Purposes.-The term 'insured deposi-
tory institution' includes any uninsured branch or agency of a foreign bank or a
commercial lending company owned or controlled by a foreign bank for pur-
poses of section 8 of this Act.
"(4) Federal Depository Institution.-The term 'Federal depository institu-
tion' njes any national bank, any Federal savings association, and any Federal
branch.
"(5) State Depository Institution.-The term 'State depository institution'
means any State bank,-any State savings associations, and any insured branch
which is not a Federal branch."
Id.
4. H.R. Rep. No. 54, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 291, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 86, 87 [hereinafter House Report].
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government for the better part of a century.5 Since the 1930s, Congress
and state legislatures have developed and refined the savings and loan
industry6 in order to supply the American public with affordable mort-
gage credit.7 Notably, "[e]very thrift is chartered by the government and
consequently, voluntarily assumes an enormous public responsibility in
return for deposit insurance and other government benefits."'
The current crisis in the thrift industry9 can be traced to a multitude of
factors, including: (i) poorly timed industry-wide deregulation; (ii) the
rising interest rate environment of the late 1970s and early 1980s; (iii)
poor internal management in the thrift industry; (iv) a lack of adequate
government supervision and regulation; (v) a regional economic collapse,
specifically in the Southwest; and (vi) insider trading and fraud. 10
As Congress observed, the Reagan Administration and the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board ("Bank Board") "continually understated the
magnitude of the S & L crisis, effectively delaying its resolution and
needlessly adding billions of dollars to the cost of resolving the prob-
lem." In response to this burgeoning fiscal dilemma, President Bush
announced a program to deal expeditiously with troubled thrift institu-
tions, while assuring the safety of insured depositors.' 2 The President's
program empowered a team of regulatory agencies to assume jurisdiction
and control over a large number of failing savings and loan associations
under the auspices of the Federal Deposit Insurance Company
("FDIC").13 The named regulatory agencies included the Bank Board,
the Federal Savings and Loan Corporation ("FSLIC"), the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC"), and the Federal Reserve Board
("Fed").14 The President's public statement announcing the program
also emphasized that the depositors would still be insured under the fed-
eral deposit insurance program. His objective was "to deal with the
problems in these troubled institutions in a way that promotes stability
and fully assures the safety of insured deposits."' 5
The goals of the President's program were multi-faceted. Among
5. See id. at 294, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 90.
6. See Note, Too Many Consonants and Not Enough Consonance: The Development
of the S&L Regulatory Framework, in Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and Regu-
lation, The S&L Crisis: Death and Transfiguration, 59 Fordham L. Rev. S263 (1991).
7. See House Report, supra note 4, at 294, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News at 90.
8. Id.
9. See Note, Causes of the Savings and Loan Debacle, in Annual Survey of Financial
Institutions and Regulation, The S&L Crisis: Death and Transfiguration, 59 Fordham L.
Rev. S301, S316-17 (1991).
10. See House Report, supra note 4, at 294-295, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News at 90-91.
11. Id. at 305, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 101.
12. See FDIC Release PR-41-89, Feb. 24, 1989, reprinted in [1988-89 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 7,600 (Mar. 3, 1989).
13. See id. at 4,644.
14. See id.
15. Id.
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those articulated were establishing control and oversight of each institu-
tion, promoting confidence in the industry, maintaining customer serv-
ices, evaluating each institution's condition by identifying and
accounting for all losses, ensuring that each institution is operated in a
safe and sound manner, and recommending the most viable alternatives
for cost effective resolution in the case of each thrift 16 The Administra-
tion's proposal was introduced in the Senate on February 22, 1989'" and
in the House on March 6, 1989.18 The Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs made minor revisions to the proposal and
introduced the amended bill to the full Senate. 9 After three days of con-
sideration, it was passed on April 19, 1989.0
Similarly, the House Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Af-
fairs revised the bill and passed similar legislation on June 15, 1989.21
Finally, on August 9, 1989, President Bush signed this "historic legisla-
tion"' into law, predicting that such measures would "preserve a safe,
efficient, and equitable financial system for ourselves and... our kids."'
II. PuRPosEs OF FIRREA
FIRREA represents a broad legislative attempt to resolve the financial
crisis confronting the S&L industry.2' The primary goal of FIRREA is
to "restore public confidence in the savings and loan industry in order to
ensure a safe, stable, and viable system of affordable housing finance. '
Its sweeping changes were designed to ameliorate mortgage financing
and housing opportunities for medium and low-level income individuals
by means of improved management, supervision and control of federal
housing credit programs and resources.26 The regulatory changes and
purposes of FIRREA are expressed in part as follows:
(i) To improve the supervision of savings associations by strength-
ening capital, accounting, and other supervisory standards.
16. See id. at 644-94, 945.
17. See 135 Cong. Rec. S1513 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1989) (statement of Sen. Riegle).
18. The bill was introduced in the House as "a bill to reform, recapitalize and consoli-
date the Federal deposit insurance system, to enhance the regulatory and enforcement
powers of the Federal financial institutions regulatory agencies, and for other purposes; to
the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs." 135 Cong. Rec. H534 (daily ed.
Mar. 6, 1989).
19. See House Report, supra note 4, at 21, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong., &
Admin. News at 352 n.1.
20. 135 Cong. Rec. (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1989).
21. See 135 Cong. Rec. H2602-H2804 (daily eds. June 15-16, 1989).
22. Remarks on Signing the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement
Act of 1989, 25 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1226 (Aug. 9, 1989).
23. Id. at 1227.
24. See Regulation of Savings Associations under the Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989,45 Bus. Law. 1013, 1013 (May 1990) [hereinafter
Regulation of Savings Associations].
25. House Report, supra note 4, at 307, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News at 103.
26. See id.
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(ii) To curtail investments and other activities of savings associa-
tions that pose unacceptable risks to the Federal deposit insurance
funds.
(fii) To promote the independence of the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation from the institutions the deposits of which it insures,
by providing an independent board of directors, adequate funding, and
appropriate powers.
(iv) To establish an Office of Thrift Supervision in the Department
of the Treasury under the general oversight of the Secretary of the
Treasury.
(v) To establish a new corporation, to be known as the Resolution
Trust Corporation, to contain, manage, and resolve failed savings
associations.
(vi) To strengthen the enforcement powers of Federal regulators of
depository institutions.27
A. Accounting Improvements
The rising interest rates of the late 1970s and early 1980s had a devas-
tating effect on the S&L.28 An unstable financial climate prompted thrift
institutions to lobby for legislative relief in the form of capital assidtance
programs.29 Once this relief was granted, the Bank Board compounded
the situation by providing support through the promulgation of "regula-
tory accounting gimmicks that allowed thrifts to technically avoid insol-
vency, and thus.., avoid being closed by the FSLIC."30  In effect, the
Bank Board's liberal accounting procedures and principles31 allowed op-
erators of weak thrifts to understate their financial difficulties.32
These accounting "gimmicks" included: enabling savings associations
to defer losses from the sale of assets with below-market yields; 33 al-
lowing the use of congressionally authorized income capital certificates in
place of real capital;34 permitting qualifying mutual capital certificates to
be included as part of Regulatory Accounting Principal ("RAP") capi-
tal;35 authorizing FSLIC member thrifts to exclude certain contra-asset
accounts36 from liabilities when computing net worth;37 and allowing net
27. FIRREA, supra note 1, §§ 101(2)-(4), (6)-(7), (9), 103 Stat. at 187 (to be codified
at 12 U.S.C. § 1811).
28. See House Report, supra note 4, at 291, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News at 87.
29. See id. at 298, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 94.
30. Id.
31. The Bank Board allowed thrifts to adhere to Regulatory Accounting Principles
("RAP") rather that the more stringent and widely accepted Generally Accepted Ac-
counting Principles ("GAAP"). See infra notes 33-43 and accompanying text.
32. See supra note 24, at 1022.
33. See House Report, supra note 1, at 298, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News at 94.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. A contra-asset account "is recorded by debiting an expense account and crediting
[an asset account].... Thus the latter account has a credit balance and is deducted in the
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worth certificates, 3' qualifying subordinated debt and appraised capital
in computing RAP net worth.39 "By 1984, the differences between RAP
and Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP") net worth at
S&L's stood at $9 billion. This meant that the industry's capital position,
or stated differently, its cushion to absorb losses was overstated by $9
billion." ° By 1986, the differential had swelled to $13.3 billion, and at
the close of 1988 the industry's capital position had proliferated to $14.9
billion.41
FIRREA specifically addresses this problem by mandating that the
Director ("DOTS") of the Office of Thrift Supervision, ("OTS") "pre-
scribe uniform accounting and disclosure standards for 'savings associa-
tions', to be used in determining savings associations compliance with all
applicable regulations."' 2 Specifically, GAAP will be applied to deposi-
tory institutions to determine their compliance with applicable regula-
tions in the same way that these principles are used for such purposes
within the federal banking agencies.43
The Director is afforded discretion in prescribing accounting standards
that are more stringent than GAAP, if it is determined that such stan-
dards are needed "to ensure the safe and sound operation of savings as-
sociations."' At a minimum, FIRREA dictates that the standards
employed must be as stringent as those utilized by the Comptroller of the
Currency when supervising national banks.45 Such rigid requirements
balance sheet from the related asset account." G. Johnson and J. Gentry, Jr., Finney and
Miller's Principles of Accounting 8th ed. (1980).
37. See House Report, supra note 1, at 298, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News, at 94. Excluded contra asset accounts include: "loans in process,
unearned discounts, and deferred fees and credits." Id.
38. A net worth certificate is a "capital assistance certificate authorized by the Gan-
St. Germaln Depository Institution Act of 1982 to assist savings institutions in meeting
mandatory net worth requirements. The assistance takes the form of a paper for paper
exchange in which an eligible institution issues capital instruments called Net Worth
Certificates to the [FHLBB] or the [FDIC]." Barron's Dictionary of Banking Terms
(1990).
39. See id.
40. Id.
41. See id.
42. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 301(4)(b)(1), 103 Stat. at 280 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1463).
43. See id § 301(4)(b)(2)(A), 103 Stat. at 280 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1463).
The standard within the Federal banking industry is one that insures "safety and
soundness" in order to "provide a financially stable industry that meets the public's credit
and other financial needs ...." See Barron's Dictionary of Banking Terms (1990).
44. IAL § 301(4)(b)(3), 103 Stat. at 280 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1463).
45. See id § 301(4)(c), 103 Stat. at 280 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1463).
[The] Comptroller of the Currency [is the] chief regulator of national banks,
appointed by the President for a five-year term, with Senate confirmation. The
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency is the supervisory agency for nation-
ally chartered banks. Each NATIONAL BANK is required to file a statement
of condition not less than four times a year. National bank examiners, under
the direction of 14 regional administrators of national banks, conduct national
bank examinations at least three times every two years. The Comptroller of the
1991] FIRRE4 S327
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leave no doubt that FIRREA intended to eliminate gimmick accounting.
B. Qualified Thrift Lender Test
FIRREA also modifies the Qualified Thrift Lender ("QTL") Test,
which Congress created as part of the Competitive Equality Banking Act
of 1987 ("CEBA")" to "ensure that savings associations fulfill their mis-
sion of providing affordable home financing."'47 For an insured institu-
tion to qualify as a thrift lender under CEBA, its average qualified thrift
investments48 must equal or exceed sixty percent of the total tangible
assets of the thrift on an average basis in three out of four quarters, and
in two out of three years.49 "However, companies that owned a thrift
before March 5, 1987 would be allowed to keep their thrift regardless of
the company's activities."'
Moreover, a savings association that fails CEBA's QTL test is not eli-
gible for advances from a Federal Home Loan Bank."1 "In addition, a
unitary savings and loan holding company controlling a savings associa-
tion that failed the QTL test [is] subject to certain restrictions on its
activities." 2
CEBA's Qualified Thrift Lender test was retained until July 1, 1991,"
at which point FIRREA's regulations will take effect. Under FIRREA's
modified QTL test, a savings association will be classified as a qualified
thrift lender only if at least seventy percent of the savings association's
portfolio assets are qualified thrift investments. 4 These investments are
defined as the total assets of the thrift, "minus the sum of (i) goodwill
and other intangible assets; (ii) the value of property used by the savings
association to conduct its business; and (iii) liquid assets.., not exceed-
ing. .. ten percent of the savings associations' total assets. '"
In an effort to induce thrifts to invest in a financially sound manner,
FIRREA narrows the type of assets that may be included as qualified
Currency also serves as one of the three directors of the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corp.
Barron's Dictionary of Banking Terms (1990).
46. Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552 (1987).
47. Regulation of Savings Associations, supra note 24, at 1065 (citing H.R. Rep. No.
261, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 137 (1987)).
48. For a complete listing of assets includable without limit and those subject to a
percentage restriction, see FIRREA, supra note 1, § 303(a)(4)(C), 103 Stat.at 347 (to be
codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1467a)
49. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1730a(o)(1)(B) (West 1989).
50. S. Rep. No. 100-19, 100th Cong., 1st. Sess. 15, reprinted in 1987 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 489, 505.
51. See id. at 14, reprinted in 1987 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 489, 504.
52. Regulation of Savings Associations, supra note 24, at 1065 (citing 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 1730a(c)(3) (West 1989)).
53. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 303(b), 103 Stat. at 350 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1467a).
54. See id. § 303(a)(1)(A), 103 Stat. 344 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1467a).
55. Id. § 303(a)(4)(B), 103 Stat. at 347 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1467a).
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thrift investments.56 Similarly, the Act allows savings associations to
double the value of certain loans and investments for the purpose of the
QTL test." FIRREA further states that thrifts must meet a seventy-
percent qualified thrift-asset requirement on a daily or weekly basis "for
the 2-year period beginning on July 1, 1991, and for each 2-year period
thereafter.""8 This provision makes it considerably more difficult for a
thrift to satisfy the QTL test. "By basing part of the QTL Test on a two
year average, the revised test makes it more difficult for an association to
requalify if the association fails to meet the seventy percent requirement
by a large margin or for an extended period of time."59 A thrift that
marginally fails the QTL Test or fails to satisfy the test for a short time,
however, will be able to requalify promptly. 6"
Currently, a thrift that does not meet the QTL test is restricted in
terms of investments, activities, branching, advances and dividends.61
Additional limitations attach if a thrift fails to qualify as a QTL within
three years of August 9, 1989.62 These limitations include the confine-
ment of the thrift's activities to those comporting to a national bank.
Moreover, the limitations mandate repayment of "outstanding advances
from any Federal home loan bank as promptly as can be prudently done
consistent with the safe and sound operation of the saving association."'63
Finally, a member that does not satisfy the QTL test may only receive
capital advances if it currently holds stock in the Federal Home Loan
Bank in an amount greater than or equal to five percent of the thrift's
total advances, divided by" its actual thrift investment percentage.65
However, the Director may grant a member thrift a grace period of up to
three years in order to achieve compliance.66
56. For a complete listing of assets subject to percentage restrictions, see id
§ 303(a)(4)(c)(iii)(I}-(I), 103 Stat. 347 (codified at U.S.C. § 1467a).
57. For a complete listing of the assets that are doubled when determining compli-
ance with the qualified thrift lender test, see FIRREA, supra note 1,
§ 303(a)(4)(c)(iii)(III)-(IV), 103 Stat. at 348 (codified at U.S.C § 1467a).
The effect of doubling the value of certain assets in computing the QTL test is to place
a premium on certain types of assets in order to promote safety within the system.
58. Id § 303(a)(1)(B), 103 Stat. at 344 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1467a).
59. Regulation of Savings Associations, Supra note 24, at 1068.
60. See id.
61. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 301(m)(3)(B)(i), 103 Stat. at 332-333 (to be codified
at 12 U.S.C. § 1467a).
62. See id. § 301(m)(3)(B)(ii), 103 Stat. at 332-333 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1467a).
63. Id. § 301(m)(3)(B)(ii)(II), 103 Stat. at 332-333 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1467a).
64. See id § 714(b)(e)(1)(A), 103 Stat. at 420 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1430(a)).
65. See id § 714(b)(e)(1)(B), 103 Stat. at 420 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1430(a)).
"The term 'actual thrift investment percentage' means the percentage determined by
dividing-
(i) the amount of the qualified thrift investments of an insured institution, by
(ii) the total amount of tangible assets of such insured institution." 12 U.S.C.
§ 1730a(o)(5)(A).
66. See id § 301(10)(c)(5), 103 Stat. at 322 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1467(a)).
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C. Improved Capital Requirements
A savings association's capital67 provides "a cushion against losses in-
curred in times of poor financial performance."6 The Bush Administra-
tion and Congress believed that in order to avoid another staggering
crisis in the S&L industry, it is vital that thrifts are adequately capital-
ized.6 9 It is the function of the Director of the OTS ("DOTS") "to pre-
scribe and maintain adequate capital standards for savings
associations."70
These standards include a leverage limit, a tangible capital require-
ment and a risk-based capital requirement.7' In order to comply with the
Act's capital standards, a savings association must meet all three require-
ments. 72 FIRREA also mandates that the capital standards be no less
stringent than those that apply to national banks.7 3
The leverage limit requires thrifts "to maintain core capital74 in an
amount equal to [no] less than [three] percent of the savings association's
total assets."7 5 The three percent core capital standard became effective
June 1, 1990.76 "Beginning then, certain qualifying intangible's [sic] can
be included on a declining basis until, by January 1, 1995, the 3 percent
requirement must be met without any qualifying intangibles."'71 FIR-
REA's phasing out of supervisory goodwill78 is set forth below:
67. The Comptroller of the Currency defines capital as follows:
"(a) Capital. The term "capital" as used in provisions of law relating to the capital of
national banking associations shall include the amount of common stock outstanding and
unimpaired plus the amount of perpetual preferred stock outstanding and unimpaired."
12 C.F.R. § 3.100(a) (January 1, 1990).
68. House Report, supra note 4, at 310, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News at 106.
69. See id.
70. Developments in Banking Law: 1989, 9 Ann. Rev. Banking L. 16 (1990).
71. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 301(5)(t)(2)(A)-(C), 103 Stat. at 304 (to be codified
at 12 U.S.C. § 1464).
72. See id. § 301(5)(t)(1)(B), 103 Stat. at 304 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464).
73. See id. § 301(5)(t)(1)(C), 103 Stat. at 304 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464).
74. Core capital is defined as core capital as defined by the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency for national banks, less any unidentifiable intangible assets, plus any purchased
mortgaged servicing rights excluded from the Comptroller's definition of capital but in-
cluded in calculating the core capital of savings associations. See FIRREA, supra note 1,
§ 301(5)(t)(9)(A), 103 Stat. at 310 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464).
75. IM § 301(5)(t)(2)(A), 103 Stat. at 304 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464).
76. See House Report, supra note 4, at 311, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News at 107.
77. Id. at 311, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 107.
78. Supervisory goodwill is defined as, "supervisory goodwill existing on April 12,
1989, amortized on a straightline basis over the shorter of-
(i) 20 years, or
(ii) the remaining period for amortization in effect on April 12, 1989." FIRREA supra
note 1, § 301(5)(t)(9)(B), 103 Stat. at 310 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464).
S330 (Vol. 59
available percentage of supervisory goodwill
includable in core captial for the period
Prior to 1/1/92 1.500
1/1/92- 12/31/92 1.000
1/1/93- 12/31/93 .750
1/1/94- 12/31/94 .375
After 1/1/95 o79
The tangible capital requirement states that a thrift must maintain tan-
gible capital comprising at least 1.5% of total assets." Tangible capital
is defined as core capital minus any intangible assets as defined by the
Comptroller of the Currency for national banks.81
The final standard is the risk-based capital requirement, which man-
dates that thrifts have total capital of eight percent of total assets, ad-
justed for relative risk, by December 31, 1992.82 "The risk based capital
requirement will be phased-in over two transition periods."83 By Decem-
ber 31, 1990, savings associations were required to have capital equal to
eighty percent of the final risk-based requirement." 4 Currently, thrifts
are required to meet ninety percent of the total capital requirement until
December 31, 1992, when full compliance becomes mandatory. 5 The
Act states that thrifts
may deviate from the risk-based capital standards applicable to na-
tional banks to reflect interest-rate risk or other risks, but such devia-
tions shall not... result in materially lower levels of capital being
required of saving associations under the risk-based capital require-
ment than would be required under the risk-based capital standards
applicable to national banks.86
If a savings association failed to comply with FIRREA's capital stan-
dards requirement prior to January 1, 1991, the Director had the discre-
tion to restrict that thrift's asset growth 7 on a case-by-case basis. In
addition, within sixty days of the date of non-compliance, the thrift is
required to submit a plan that:
(i) addresses the savings association's need for increased capital;
(ii) describes the manner in which the savings association will in-
crease its capital so as to achieve compliance with capital standards;
79. See id § 301(5)(t)(9)(C), 103 Stat. at 310 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464).
80. See id. § 301(5)(t)(2)(B), 103 Stat. at 304 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1464(t)(2)(B)).
81. See id § 301(5)(t)(9)(C), 103 Stat. at 310 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1464(t)(9)(C)).
82. See Regulation of Savings Associations, supra note 24, at 1052.
83. Id.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 301(5)(t)(2)(C), 103 Stat. at 304 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1464(t)(2)(C)).
87. See id § 301(5)(t)(6)(A)(i), 103 Stat. at 307 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1464(t)(6)(A)(i)).
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(iii) specifies the types and levels of activities in which the savings
association will engage;
(iv) requires any increase in assets to be accompanied by an in-
crease in tangible capital not less in percentage amount then the lever-
age limit then applicable;
(v) requires any increase in assets to be accompanied by an in-
crease in capital not less in percentage amount than required under the
risk-based capital standard then applicable; and
(vi) is acceptable to the director."8
The DOTS will consider any material non-compliance with the plan to
be an unsafe and unsound practice. 9  Beginning January 1, 1991, the
DOTS will prohibit asset growth in non-complying thrifts9° with some
exceptions. 9 Further, the DOTS will require savings associations that
are not in compliance with the Act's "capital standards to comply with a
capital directive issued by the Director." 92 This directive curtails the
thrift's ability to pay dividends and suspend outlays for compensation.93
D. Office of Thrift Supervision94
FIRREA also amends the Home Owner's Loan Act of 193395 by sup-
planting the Federal Home Loan Bank Board ("Bank Board") with the
newly created OTS.9 6 The OTS is subject to the oversight of the Secre-
tary of the Treasury9 7 and "is headed by a director who is the primary
federal regulator of both federal and state-chartered savings
associations."98
Congress authorized the DOTS to prescribe regulations and issue or-
ders that are necessary to carry out FIRREA and all other laws within
his jurisdiction.99 In general, it is the DOTS role to "provide for the
examination, safe and sound operation, and regulation of savings
88. Id § (5)(t)(6)(A)(ii)(I)-(VI), 103 Stat. at 307 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1464(t)(6)(A)(ii)(I)-(II)).
89. See id. § (5)(t)(6)(E), 103 Stat. at 308 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(t)(6)(E)).
90. See id § 301(5)(t)(7)(B), 103 Stat. at 308 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1464(t)(7)(B)).
91. These exceptions are listed at id at § 301(5)(t)(7)(C), 103 Stat. at 308-09 (to be
codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(t)(7)(C)).
92. Id. § 301(5)(t)(6)(B)(ii), 103 Stat. at 307 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1464(t)(6)(B)(ii)).
93. See id.
94. See Note, The Office of Thrift Supervision, in Annual Survey of Financial
Institutions and Regulation, The S&L Crisis: Death and Transfiguration, 59 Fordham L.
Rev. S363 (1991).
95. Ch. 64, 48 Stat. 128 (1933) (codified as amended 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1468 (1988)).
96. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 301(3)(e)(1), 103 Stat. at 278 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1462a(e)(1)).
97. See id. § 301(3)(b)(1), 103 Stat. at 278 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1462a(b)(1)).
98. Regulation of Savings Associations, supra note 24, at 1025, (footnotes omitted).
99. See id.
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associations."o
Specifically, the Director's responsibilities include making an annual
report to Congress, as well as appointing and compensating all employees
of the OTS. 0 Further, the Director is imbued with all authority origi-
nally vested in the Bank Board or its chairman that was not expressly
delegated to another agency or subject to repeal.102
E. Improved Enforcement Powers
FIRREA expands the enforcement powers and increases both civil
and criminal penalties for institutions and individuals who violate the
Act or an order of an authorized agency.10 3  The strengthened sanc-
tions are designed to "give a clear signal to those who would violate fed-
eral banking laws that such conduct would not be tolerated."' 4
Regulators have estimated that fraud or insider trading accounted for as
much as forty percent of all failed savings associations. 0 5
The Act sets forth an expansive definition of "persons participating in
the conduct of the affairs"" of a financial institution. Such "persons"
include "(a) employees, agents, consultants and shareholders, (b) parties
proposing a change in control, (c) independent contractors,"°7 such as
appraisers, attorneys and accountants (who are not otherwise employees
or insiders covered within category (a)), and (d) such other persons as
the agencies may prescribe by regulations."'' 10 This language signifi-
cantly broadens the civil enforcement powers of regulatory agencies by
expanding the number of potentially liable persons.
100. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 301(4)(a)(1), 103 Stat. at 280 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1463(a)(1)).
101. See id § 301(3)(f),(g)(1), 103 Stat. at 278 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1462a(f),(g)(1)).
102. See id § 301(3)(e)(1)-(2), 103 Stat. at 278-279 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1462a).
103. See House Report, supra note 4, at 311, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News at 107.
104. See id
105. See id at 300, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 96. But cf
Green, After The Falk The Criminal Law Enforcement Response to the S&L Crisis, in
Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and Regulation, The S&L Crisis: Death and
Transfiguration, 59 Fordham L. Rev. S155, S162 (1991).
106. Id at 391-392, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 187-188.
107. Institution-affiliated independent contractor means "any independent contractor
(including any attorney, appraiser or accountant) who knowingly or recklessly partici-
pates in -
(A)any violation of any law or regulation;
(B)any breach of fiduciary duty; or
(C)any unsafe or unsound practice,
which caused or is likely to cause more than a minimal financial loss to, or a significant
adverse effect on the insured credit union." FIRREA, supra note 1, § 901(a)(3), 103 Stat.
at 446 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1786(r)(3)).
108. House Report, supra note 4, at 391-392, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News at 187-188.
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1. Cease and Desist Orders
FIRREA further amends the Federal Deposit Insurance Act
("FDIA") °9 with regard to cease-and-desist orders. First, the Act
"clarifies the agencies' authority to issue an order requiring persons and
institutions to take affirmative action to correct certain conditions.""110
Furthermore, the authority to issue a cease and desist order under FIR-
REA includes the ability to place limits on activities and functions of
insured thrifts or any affiliates."1
Moreover, FIRREA expands FDIA's provisions for temporary cease
and desist orders. A temporary cease and desist order is the appropriate
remedy when an insured institution's books and records are so incom-
plete or inaccurate that the financial condition of that institution cannot
be determined through normal supervisory procedures.' 2 The tempo-
rary order may require either termination of the activity causing the
omission or inaccuracy, or affirmative action to restore the books to a
complete and accurate state."13
2. Suspension and Removal
The FDIA114 and the Federal Credit Union Act" 5 follow different
standards for removal actions, depending on when the indiscretion oc-
curred.'16 FIRREA combines the two and makes legal grounds for re-
moval and suspension the same, irrespective of the timing of the
misconduct. 1 7 The appropriate banking regulatory agency must show
(i) that an institution-affiliated party has violated any law or regulation,
a final cease and desist order, a written condition imposed by an appro-
priate federal banking agency, or any written agreement between the in-
stitution and the federal banking agency, 1 8 or (ii) participated in any
unsafe or unsound practice with any insured savings association or busi-
ness institution or119 (iii) "committed or engaged in any act, omission, or
practice which constitutes a breach of such party's fiduciary duty."'
120
109. 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (1988).
110. House Report, supra note 4, at 392, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News at 188.
111. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 902(a)(1)(C)(7), 103 Stat. at 451 (to be codified at
12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(7)).
112. See id. § 902(a)(2)(B)(3)(A), 103 Stat. at 451 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1818(c)(3)(A)).
113. See iL § 902(a)(2)(B)(3)(A)(i)-(ii), 103 Stat. at 451 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1818(c)(3)(A)(i)-(ii)).
114. 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (1988).
115. 12 U.S.C. § 1751 (1988).
116. See House Report, supra note 4, at 392, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News at 188.
117. See id. at 392, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 188.
118. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 903(a)(1)(i)(I)-(IV), 103 Stat. at 453 (to be codified
at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(1)).
119. See id.
120. Id.
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Further, the agency must show that, by reason of such activity described
above, (i) the depository institution has suffered or is likely to suffer a
financial loss or some other harm, or (ii) the depositors have been or
could be prejudiced, or (iii) the violating party has received some benefit
from such impropriety, which involves personal dishonesty or demon-
strates willful disregard for the safety or soundness of such institution.'
Once all of the above requirements have been satisfied, the agency may
serve upon the violating party a written notice of the agency's intention
either to remove that party from office, or to prevent such party from
further participating in the activities of any insured depositoryinstitution. "2
3. Civil Money Penalties
The Act also amends the FDIA so that civil money penalties are no
longer limited to violations of cease-and-desist orders." FIRREA now
allows for civil money penalties to be assessed against any depository
institution that violates any law or regulation, final or temporary order,
written condition imposed by an appropriate Federal banking agency, or
written agreement between such institution and such agency. 24 Further,
civil money penalties are raised from $100 or $1000 to $5000 per day
during the time of the violation. 25 The Act also raises the maximum
civil penalties to $1 million for individuals and the lesser of $1 million or
1% of an institution's total assets. 126
4. Criminal Penalties
The Act strengthens criminal sanctions by raising the maximum pen-
alty from a fine of not more than $5000 and/or 1 year imprisonment,127
to a fine of not more than $100,000 per day or 1 year imprisonment or
both for misdemeanors. 2 ' These penalties attach to knowing violations
of the Act's provisions, or violations of regulatory orders issued by ap-
propriate regulatory agencies under the Act.'29 FIRREA makes it a fel-
ony intentionally to deceive, defraud or derive significant profits from
121. See id § 903(a)(1)(B)(C), 103 Stat. at 453 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1818(e)(1)).
122. See id § 903(a)(1), 103 Stat. at 453 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(1)).
123. House Report, supra note 4, at 393, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong & Admire
News at 189.
124. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 907(a)(2)(A)(i)-(iv), 103 Stat. at 462 (to be codified
at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2)).
125. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 907(a)(2)(A), 103 Stat. at 462-463 (to be codified at
12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2)).
126. See id. § 907(i)(F)(iv)(I)II)(aa)(bb), 103 Stat. at 474 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.§ 1972(2)(F)).
127. 12 U.S.C. § 1818G) (1988).
128. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 907(j)(a)(1)-(2), 103 Stat. at 475 (to be codified at
12 U.S.C. § 1818G)).
129. See id § 907, 103 Stat. at 475 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1847).
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any knowing violation of the Act.1 30 The corresponding penalty for such
offense is a fine of not more than $1 million per day and/or five years
imprisonment. 131 FIRREA similarly imposes felony sanctions for know-
ingly violating, any order and participating in any manner in the affairs
of a depository institution or the like as defined by the Act.
132
F. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 133
FIRREA overhauls the insurance system previously in place by re-
placing the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation ("FSLIC")
with the Savings Associations Insurance Fund ("SAIF").1 34 The newly
constructed SAIF will insure all those institutions formerly covered by
the FSLIC.135 Similarly, FIRREA calls for the dissolution of the Perma-
nent Insurance Fund ("PIF"). In its place will emerge the Bank Insur-
ance Fund ("BIF"), which insures those banks previously insured by the
PIF. 1 36 The newly formed funds will be "(1)maintained and adminis-
tered by the Corporation; (2)maintained separately and not commingled;
and (3)used by the Corporation to carry out its insurance purposes in the
manner provided in this subsection."' 137
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC" or "Corpora-
tion"),1 38 however, remains the insurer of deposits at banks and savings
associations that are entitled to the benefits defined by the FDIA. While
the FDIC is not the main federal regulator of thrifts,1 39 FIRREA ex-
pands the authority of the Corporation to take enforcement action
against thrifts."4 The FDIC's Board of Directors may recommend that
the DOTS take any authorized enforcement actions specified by the
Act. 141 If the DOTS fails to follow the FDIC's recommendation within
sixty days, the Board of Directors may authorize the Corporation to take
the necessary corrective measures. Before any action is taken the Board
130. See id.
131. Id.
132. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 908(a)j), 103 Stat. at 477 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 18180)).
133. See Note, The FDIC's Enhanced Powers Over Savings Associations: Does FIRREA
Make It "SAIF"?, in Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and Regulation, The S&L
Crisis: Death and Transfiguration, 59 Fordham L. Rev. S381 (1991); Note, A Note to
Congress and the FDIC: After FIRREA, Where's the BIF, in Annual Survey of Financial
Institutions and Regulation, The S&L Crisis: Death and Transfiguration, 59 Fordham L.
Rev. S411 (1991).
134. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 211(6), 103 Stat. at 219 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(a)).
135. See id. §§ 401, 211(3), 103 Stat. at 354, 219 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(a)(4)-(7)).
136. See id. § 211(m)(6), 103 Stat. at 218-219 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)).
137. Id. § 211(4)(a)-(c), 103 Stat. at 218-219 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)).
138. See 12 U.S.C. § 1811 Federal Deposit Insurance Act.
139. See Regulation of Savings Associations, supra note 24, at 1026.
140. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 912(t)(1), 103 Stat. at 482 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1818).
141. See id. § 912(t)(1), 103 Stat. at 482-483 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818).
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must determine whether: the thrift is unsafe or unsound, or whether by
not taking action, the thrift will continue to utilize unsafe or unsound
business practices.142
G. Resolution Trust Corporation 143
FIRREA also amends the Federal Home Loan Bank Act'" to estab-
lish the Resolution Trust Corporation ("RTC") 45 under the exclusive
management of the FDIC.'" To develop a strategic plan to aid the RTC
in meeting its goals,147 FIRREA also establishes the Oversight Board,
which consists of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development, and two independent members ap-
pointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. 48
These offices will manage and resolve all cases involving depository insti-
tutions that were insured by the FSLIC before the enactment of FIR-
REA and for which a conservator or receiver had been appointed
between January 1, 1989 and August 9, 1989 or will be appointed before
August 9, 1992.19 The RTC is also responsible for managing the Fed-
eral Asset Disposition Association and conducting its operations in a
manner that maximizes the return from the sale or disposition of failed
institutions. 5 At the same time, the RTC must make efforts to mini-
mize the effect of these transactions on real estate and financial mar-
kets, " while making the most efficient use of federally acquired funds. '
The RTC must balance the above-mentioned interests while minimizing
losses153 and preserving a market for low and moderate income
individuals."S
CONCLUSION
The demise of the S&L industry mandated sweeping legislative action.
142. See id. § 912(t)(2)(A)-(B), 103 Stat. at 483 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818).
143. See Note, The Resolution Trust Corporation: Waste Management and the S&L
Crisis, in Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and Regulation, The S&L Crisis: Death
and Transfiguration, 59 Fordham L. Rev. S339 (1991).
144. 12 U.S.C. § 1421 et seq.
145. House Report, supra note 4, at 356, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News at 152.
146. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 501(b)(1)(C), 103 Stat. at 364 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1441(a)).
147. See id § 501(a)(14)(A)-(B), 103 Stat. at 367 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1441(a)).
148. See id § 501(a)(3)(A)(i)-(iv), 103 Stat. at 364 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1441(a)).
149. See id § 501 (b)(3)(A), 103 Stat. at 369 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1441(a)).
150. Id § 501 (b)(3)(C)(i), 103 Stat. at 369 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1441(a)).
151. Id § 501(b)(3)(C)(ii), 103 Stat. at 369, (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1441(a)).
152. Id § 501 (b)(3)(C)(iii), 103 Stat. at 370 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1441(a)).
153. Id § 501(b)(3)(C)(iv), 103 Stat. at 370 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1441(a)).
154. Id § 501(b)(3)(C)(v), 103 Stat. at 370 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1441(a)).
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As a result, FIRREA became law. The thrift industry must persevere if
our American economy is to thrive. With that in mind, FIRREA at-
tempts to rectify the flaws within the system and put the S&L industry
back on course. This Note has highlighted FIRREA's effects and
changes on the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Company and the Resolution Trust Company. The following four
notes will provide an in-depth analysis of these agencies, emphasizing the
influences of recent developments on S&L's and commercial banks.
Anthony C. Providenti Jr.
